The Nikolais/Louis Dance Technique provides the definite resource for understanding and practicing the influential dance technique developed by two pioneers of modern dance, Alwin Nikolais and Murray Louis. The Nikolais/Louis technique is presented in a week-to-week classroom manual, providing an indispensable tool for teachers and students of this widely studied movement practice. Theoretical background for further reading is set off from the manual for those interested in deeper study. Their philosophy and methodology span a broad readership and offer an important (...) addition to dance literature and American cultural history. (shrink)

Nikolai Zhinkin’s review of Ernst Cassirer is so far the earliest document of the discussion in Russia about Cassirer’s conception of myth and his theory of symbolic forms. The text is published from Zhinkin’s archive. Zhinkin here notes a reorientation of Neo-Kantianism that reveals its hidden relativism and stands as a symptom of its downfall.

This is a translation from the Russian of Nikolai Lossky’s “Heдocтaтки гнoceoлoгiи Бepгcoнa и влiянie иxъ нa eгo мeтaфизикy” (The Defects of Bergson’s Epistemology and Their Consequences on His Metaphysics), which was published in the journal Boпpocы филocoфiи и пcиxoлoгiи (Questions of Philosophy and Psychology) in 1913. In this article, Lossky criticizes Bergson’s epistemological dualism, which completely separates intuition from reason, and which rejects reason in favor of intuition. For Bergson, reality is continuous, indivisible, fluid, etc., and reason distorts it (...) through its acts of division, abstraction, extraction, and so on. Lossky argues that this conclusion does not follow. Reason does not distort the living flow of reality; it rather provides a window unto aspects of the otherwise undivided seamless flowing organic whole. In fact, reason is itself a species of intuition in its own right, namely an intellectual intuition, the object of which is the atemporal facet of the world (the Platonic ideal realm), which is necessary for the existence of its temporal facet. Lossky thus challenges Bergson’s one-sided and self-defeating reduction of being to a flux of changes devoid of changing things. (Frédéric Tremblay). (shrink)

This is a translation from Bulgarian into English of Nikolai Lossky’s “Razlichniiat smisul na dumata intuitsiia” (“The Different Senses of the Word Intuition”), published in the Sofianite journal Filosofski pregled (Philosophical Review), 1931, year III, book 1, pp. 1–9. In this article, solicited by the journal’s editor-in-chief, the Bulgarian philosopher Dimitar Mihalchev, Lossky surveys the different ways in which the word “intuition” (intuitsiia) has been used throughout the history of philosophy: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Friedrich Jacobi, Ivan Kireevski, Alexei Khomyakov, (...) Vladimir Solovyov, Bergson, Husserl, and Hans Driesch. Lossky then situates his own use of the word within this philosophical tradition and compares his intuitivism with gnoseologies similar to his own, namely, those of Semyon Frank, Johannes Rehmke, Max Scheler, Paul Linke, Dimitar Mihalchev, the English realists (Samuel Alexander and John Laird), the American realists (Edwin Holt, Walter Marvin, William Montague, Ralph Perry, Walter Pitkin, and Edward Spaulding), and the Neo-Scholastic Josef Gredt. As such, the article makes a valuable addendum to his Obosnovanie intuitivizma (The Foundation of Intuitivism) (1906) and provides a helpful synopsis of his theory of knowledge, which, in accordance with the Russian terminological tradition, he calls “gnoseology”. (shrink)

Researchers’ attention has been drawn to parallels between Homer’s Odyssey and the Epic of Gilgamesh. However, hitherto, no connections have been observed between Kazantzakis’s Sequel and the Mesopotamian work. Convergent are the primary motivations and actions undertaken by the protagonists of both poems, particularly their “peregrinations” to the boundaries of the world, dictated by eschatological anxieties. Moreover, the hero of Kazantzakis’s Sequel undergoes a transformation analogous to the legendary ruler of Uruk: under the influence of concerns, the proud kings opt (...) for solitary wanderings, which results in better self-understanding and higher axiological awareness. The comparison of symbols, such as the sun, fire, lightning, the Water of Life and Death, and theriomorphic allegories, indicates Kazantzakis’s utilization of numerous intermediary sources stemming from the ancient Near Eastern tradition. An additional aim of the article is to indicate interpretative possibilities of books describing the wanderings of the Odyssean spirit after abandoning the project of building the “ideal city,” as versions of ars moriendi: the art of overcoming the fear of death. (shrink)

Genomes of higher eukaryotes contain abundant non‐coding repeated sequences whose overall biological impact is unclear. They comprise two categories. The first consists of retrotransposon‐derived elements. These are three major families of retroelements (LINEs, SINEs and LTRs). SINEs are clustered in gene‐rich regions and are found in promoters of genes while LINEs are concentrated in gene‐poor regions and are depleted from promoters. The second class consists of non‐coding tandem repeats (satellite DNAs and TTAGGG arrays), which are associated with mammalian centromeres, heterochromatin (...) and telomeres. Terminal TTAGGG arrays are involved in telomere capping and satellite DNAs are located in heterochromatin, which is implicated in transcription silencing by gene repositioning (relocalization). It is unknown whether interstitial TTAGGG sequences, which are present in many vertebrates, have a function. Here, evidence will be presented that retroelements and TTAGGG arrays are involved in regulation of gene expression. Retroelements can provide binding sites for transcription factors and protect promoter CpG islands from repressive chromatin modifications, and may be also involved in nuclear compartmentalization of transcriptionally active and inactive domains. Interstitial telomere‐like sequences can form dynamically maintained three‐dimensional nuclear networks of transcriptionally inactive domains, which may be involved in transcription silencing like classic heterochromatin. BioEssays 30:338–348, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This is a translation from Russian to English of Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky’s “Tpaнcцeндeнтaльнo-фeнoмeнoлoгичecкiй идeaлизмъ Гyccepля”, published in the émigré journal Пyть in 1939. In this article, Lossky presents and criticizes Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Like many successors of Husserl’s “Göttingen School,” Lossky interprets Husserl’s transcendental idealism as a Neo-Kantian idealism and he criticizes it on the ground that it leads to a form of solipsism. In light of his own epistemology and his metaphysical system, he also claims that, although Husserl is (...) more radical than Descartes in his methodological doubt, he is not radical enough, because his abstention from existential judgment with regard to the external world is itself an existential judgment. In this regard, Lossky affirms that his own critically-informed defense of naive realism is in fact more radical than Husserl’s transcendental idealism. (shrink)

The Russian philosopher Nikolai Onufrievich Lossky considered himself a Leibnizian of sorts. He accepted parts of Leibniz’s doctrine of monads, although he preferred to call them ‘substantival agents’ and rejected the thesis that they have neither doors nor windows. In Lossky’s own doctrine, monads have existed since the beginning of time, they are immortal, and can evolve or devolve depending on the goodness or badness of their behavior. Such evolution requires the possibility for monads to reincarnate into the bodies of (...) creatures of a higher level on the scala perfectionis. According to this theory, a monad can evolve by being progressively reincarnated multiple times through a sort of process of metamorphosis from the level of the most elementary particles all the way up to the level of human beings or even higher. Lossky argues that the works of Leibniz contain scattered elements of such a systematic doctrine of reincarnation. He attempts to reconstitute this doctrine in an article that appeared both in Russian and German in 1931. The Russian version, ‘Ученiе Лейбница о перевоплощенiи какъ метаморфозѣ’, was published in the Сборникъ Русскаго института въ Прагѣ, vol. 2, 1931, pp. 77–88. The German version appeared under the title ‘Leibniz’ Lehre von der Reinkarnation als Metamorphose,’ in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 40, n. 2, 1931, pp. 214–226. The content of the Russian and German versions is roughly the same, except for the omission, in the German version, of a mention of David Hume in the second sentence and of one paragraph and a half at the end of the article. The following is a translation of this article. I translated the text from the Russian version, which was in all appearances written first, but I also took the German version into account. The original pagination is added in angle brackets. Angle brackets are used wherever the additions are mine. — Frédéric Tremblay. (shrink)

Despite its short historical moment in the sun, behaviorism has become something akin to a theoria non grata, a position that dare not be explicitly endorsed. The reasons for this are complex, of course, and they include sociological factors which we cannot consider here, but to put it briefly: many have doubted the ambition to establish law-like relationships between mental states and behavior that dispense with any sort of mentalistic or intentional idiom, judging that explanations of intelligent behavior require reference (...) to qualia and/or mental events. Today, when behaviorism is discussed at all, it is usually in a negative manner, either as an attempt to discredit an opponent’s view via a reductio, or by enabling a position to distinguish its identity and positive claims by reference to what it is (allegedly) not. In this paper, however, we argue that the ghost of behaviorism is present in influential, contemporary work in the field of embodied and enactive cognition, and even in aspects of the phenomenological tradition that these theorists draw on. Rather than take this to be a problem for these views as some have, we argue that once the behaviorist dimensions are clarified and distinguished from the straw-man version of the view, it is in fact an asset, one which will help with task of setting forth a scientifically reputable version of enactivism and/or philosophical behaviorism that is nonetheless not brain-centric but behavior-centric. While this is a bit like “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” strategy, as Shaun Gallagher notes (2019), with the shared enemy of behaviorism and enactivism being classical Cartesian views and/or orthodox cognitivism in its various guises, the task of this paper is to render this alliance philosophically plausible. Doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02432-1. (shrink)

This is a translation from the Russian of Nikolai Lossky’s review of Henri Bergson, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932). The review was published in the Parisian émigré journal Новый Град (Cité nouvelle) in 1932. In this review, Lossky criticizes Bergson for leaving some key problems of the philosophy of religion unresolved, namely that of God’s relation to the world (theism vs. pantheism), that of immortality, as well as that of evil. He also criticizes Bergson’s (...) “extreme biologism” in his explanation of morality, which, in his view, subjectivizes the objects of religion. For Lossky, the symbolic images of the Christian religion are not subjective “fabulations,” but real symbols through which God reveals himself to us. Likewise, according to Lossky, true morality cannot be explained in terms of biological adaptation, but must rely on the foundation of an objective, i.e., Platonic, axiological sphere. (Frédéric Tremblay). (shrink)

In their update to Intentionality All-Stars, Hutto and Satne claim that there is currently no satisfactory account for a naturalised conception of content. From this the pair suggest that we need to consider whether content is present in all aspects of intelligence, that is, whether it is content all the way down. Yet if we do not have an acceptable theory of content such a question seems out of place. It seems more appropriate to question whether content itself is the (...) problematic assumption. This paper will explore this question, with the analysis hinging on whether those trying to naturalise content are facing a tough challenge as Haugeland has suggested, or whether it is a genuine dilemma as Hutto has suggested elsewhere. If those attempting to naturalise content are facing a genuine dilemma, a dilemma in which the non-existence of content is one of the horns, then it would seem that the issue is not at what stage you posit content, but whether you should posit content at all. This also has the added benefit of shifting the debate to a more global discussion, that is, the best way to explain intelligence, period. (shrink)

First published in English in 1935, this is a vital and stimulating critical appraisal of contemporary thought in the post-World War One era. Written by a selection of leading Marxist thinkers including Nikolai Bukharin, who would later become one of the most famous victims of Stalin's show trials, this work offers a Marxist critique of contemporary thought relating to philosophy, science and history. The authors all lean towards the view that the general tendency of modern thought is to abandon the (...) historical method and to deny progress, with the conclusion that Marxism was the only historical and progressive outlook in science, philosophy and history in the period following the First World War and the Communist revolution in Russia. A fascinating document of great historical and political interest which offers an invaluable insight into contemporary thought in the Soviet Union of the 1930s. (shrink)

Within a physicalist-mechanistic worldview, in which we cannot be more than intelligent, self-reproducing biomachines or biobots, fundamentals of a new approach to the science of human self-explanation are outlined. Some a priori logical necessities, or determinants, of any biobot’s control system design are recognized. Evolution had to satisfy them, but neuroscience and cognitive science so far do not clearly see these basics. It is concluded that the old part of the brain still contains the genetically fixed drives, responses, and the (...) physiological control. Here is the seat of an ancient somatic self that is not intelligent but is still the active center of our life. The neocortex has evolved to serve the somatic self with intelligence by individually building a virtual model of the external material and social world. This model is used by the somatic self to “pre-play” intended actions and responses to see whether they would satisfy its needs. This schema of global brain function provides the neurological foundation for the ego-id dichotomy in analytic psychology, as well as some critique of it. Following the groundbreaking experiments by Benjamin Libet and John-Dylan Haynes et al. , consciousness is taken as a “theater” that presents what the neural networks already have worked out, and freedom of the will is limited. The explosive growth of culture and civilization began when neocortical power exceeded a certain threshold. This can be taken as a quasi-mutation that projected us into a supra-biological space of existence that is new to natural history. It is not clear whether this event will lead to a positive future for humanity or to doom. Functional religion is seen as a neurosystemic attempt to bring back the earlier natural state. Thus, it can be valuable when cleared of mythological ballast. (shrink)

Andrei Platonov is known mainly for his larger works, often perceived as a surrealistic critic of revolutionary utopia and the building of communism. This makes it all the more interesting to consi...

Thomas Mann’s famous novella “Death in Venice” is more than social critics or metaphor of artistic search for means. Its ambiguous poetry of forbidden longing offers a game we play ever since, a drama of strange, dreamlike romance unfolding itself in a highly troublesome atmosphere of ordinary life succumbing to the oncoming devastation and catastrophe of the outer world that inexplicably links with the wishes of a soul. This plot became a focus of ideas, a web of meanings covering more (...) and more areas of mentality and imagination while living on. One of the latter writers rarely compared to Mann, a popular American author Stephen King, master of macabre fantasy, suddenly shows some extraordinary level of coincidence of his works’ throughout motives/invariants with those of the European classic. The answers both of them are chasing after lie in the mysterious character of the Whole of the world denying any isolate and solid sense, medium lands of affection and connection, Gordian knots of disastrous dialectics interweaving will and passivity, creation and destruction. Why dark fantasy (that King embodies) constantly insists on destroying, erasing the entire world for the sake of some bittersweet heroic pathos upon its ruin, as before Mann unleashes the epidemics to his story’s bourgeois backgrounds to celebrate the phantom love of his characters? Why does Beauty transgress the borders of subjectivity very much like Death does the borders of physicality, and they both lead us to the same revelation of some great apophatic quasi-Platonian chora at the core of our being where everything is born and we are all one? (shrink)

In the summer of 1925, a debutant writer, Aleksandr Beliaev, published a ‘scientific-fantastic story’, which depicted the travails of a severed human head living in a laboratory, supported by special machinery. Just a few months later, a young medical researcher, Sergei Briukhonenko, succeeded in reviving the severed head of a dog, using a special apparatus he had devised to keep the head alive. This paper examines the relationship between the literary and the scientific experiments with severed heads in post-revolutionary Russia, (...) which reflected the anxieties about death, revival, and survival in the aftermath of the 1914–1923 ‘reign of death’ in that country. It contrasts the anguished ethical questions raised by the story with the public fascination for ‘science that conquers death’. (shrink)

The article presents a systemic and historical view of wars taking into account the generalization of modern concepts about their nature and causes. The generalization is produced on the basis of a political and sociological apparatus with such basic concepts as: "concerns" of different types (including "interests", "motives", "goals", "values"), an extension of the challenge-response scheme (A. Toynbee), positive and negative "reinforcement" (Thorndike-Skinner), and "support structures" (A. Stinchcombe). All the concerns related to wars are based on the social universals of (...) M. Weber and M. Mann: power-security, power-dominance, prestige-dignity-legitimacy, and wealth-resources-access to resources. Geopolitical concerns (regarding control over territories), symbolic stakes, and concerns with maintaining the international order are considered. The prioritization of relevant concerns changes in both the long run of social evolution and the short run of dynamics of interactions. The article considers spiral dynamics as a dynamic model of the cause of unintended wars "that no one wanted." Relevant decisions and actions of rulers and elites related to war are analyzed in the context of fast and slow thinking according to D. Kahneman. The general principles of social interaction and social evolution allow us to judge the conditions that increase and decrease the probability of new wars, as well as the regularities of the dynamics and termination of wars. Empirical generalizations of the characteristics of wars in world history made by modern specialists (S. Van Evera, G. Cashman, etc.) are discussed. It is shown what role wars play in the co-evolution of social, mental, and techno-natural orders, as well as in social evolution in general. (shrink)